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ABSTRACT: I analyze Jason Stanley’s model for how propaganda works, paying close attention to Stanley’s own rheto-
ric. I argue that Stanley’s language be supplemented with a vocabulary that helps us to attend to what sorts of 
things move democratic knowers (epistemically speaking), what sorts of things do not, and why. In addition, 
I argue that the reasonableness necessary for considering the views of others within democratic deliberation 
ought to be understood, not as an empathic, but as an interactive capacity. Finally, I critique some of the ways 
in which Stanley speaks about the marginalized populations he aims to support.
Keywords: Propaganda, Ideology, Epistemology.
RESUMEN: Analizo el modelo debido a Jason Stanley sobre el modo en que funciona la propaganda, prestando aten-
ción en particular a la retórica del propio Stanley. Argumento la conveniencia de que el lenguaje de Stanley se 
complemente con un vocabulario que nos ayude a prestar atención a las cosas que motivan a los agentes de co-
nocimiento democráticos (epistémicamente hablando), a las que no lo hacen, y por qué. Adicionalmente, argu-
mento que la razonabilidad que se necesita para tomar en consideración los puntos de vista de otros en la deli-
beración democrática debería entenderse como una capacidad no de empatía, sino de interacción. Finalmente, 
critico alguna de las formas en que Stanley habla de las poblaciones marginadas a las que quiere dar apoyo.
Palabras clave: propaganda, ideología, epistemología.
Propaganda is rhetoric that is intended to move its audience directly to action, bypassing 
the capacity to deliberate. Moreover, the force of propaganda is typically not experienced 
as outrightly coercive but rather appears to align with the will even while it may move ac-
tors in a way that is counter to their consciously held or avowed commitments. How words 
are able to do so and the implications for democracy are the subject of Jason Stanley’s new 
book, How Propaganda Works. Examining the ways in which language can be used prop-
agandistically, Stanley is deeply concerned with how material inequality can render per-
sons susceptible to the kind of propaganda that undermines democratic deliberation, and 
in particular can unfairly exclude from consideration the voices and concerns of materially 
disempowered groups. For these reasons, his analysis gives those who are working at the in-
tersection of political philosophy, philosophy of language, and epistemology much to con-
sider. In what follows, I first relay some of the details of Stanley’s argument, paying close at-
tention to Stanley’s own rhetoric as something that might move readers in ways consonant 
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with or counter to the book’s aim of supporting democracy. Ultimately, I recommend that 
Stanley’s language be supplemented with a vocabulary that helps us to attend not just to 
what knowers believe and fail to believe when engaging in democratic deliberation mired 
by pernicious propaganda, but to what sorts of things move democratic knowers (epistemi-
cally speaking), what sorts of things do not, and why.
Emphasizing epistemic movement over belief, I argue, not only helps to keep in fo-
cus the way propaganda works, but also reveals some problems with Stanley’s appeal to the 
need for empathy in democratic societies. Instead, I argue that the sort of reasonableness 
necessary for considering the views of others within democratic deliberation ought to be 
understood, not as an empathic, but as an interactive capacity. Finally, I critique some of 
the ways in which Stanley’s book fails to be sufficiently interactive with regard to marginal-
ized populations, precisely those whom the book aims to support.
Understanding propaganda (and how the language we use to understand propaganda works)
Stanley’s book seeks to demonstrate the mechanisms by which propaganda, or speech that 
mobilizes ideals for a particular purpose (2015, 52) by way of emotion (2015, 53), operates. 
One of the book’s main concerns is the way a particular kind of propaganda, “undermin-
ing demagoguery,” impedes the principles of democratic deliberation and hence democracy 
itself. Undermining demagoguery, on Stanley’s account, is vexing not only because it can 
be hard to identify, but also because it can be offered sincerely and through the use of true 
claims (2015, 41-46). It is, therefore, hard to identify not only when coming from others, 
but even presumably when spoken by oneself. The key to understanding how undermin-
ing demagoguery works, Stanley argues, is to understand the relationship of propaganda to 
flawed ideologies. For Stanley, an ideology is “the record of expectations of various goods 
built out of regularities of convention… the beliefs that unreflectively guide us through 
the social world.” (2015, 184). In this vein, ideologies are not just sets of individual men-
tal states, but are tied to one’s self-conception, shared with others, and informed by struc-
tural features of our environment, including social structures (Stanley 2015, 185). Conse-
quently they can be hard to shake, but might be more easily dislodged under different social 
conditions. This is the foundation for Stanley’s argument that democracy requires mate-
rial equality, since, on his account, the structural conditions of material inequality give rise 
to flawed ideologies that make citizens susceptible to undermining demagoguery, which 
works to impede democratic deliberation by using terms and phrases that implicitly contra-
dict the ideals to which they explicitly appeal (Stanley, 2015, 158-162).
Because undermining propaganda works through implication, the speaker can distance 
herself from the undermining aspect of her speech by contending that she is only forward-
ing the explicit at-issue content of what she says. On the one hand, the explicit content of 
undermining propaganda will appeal to an ideal the propagandist expressly avows and may 
even sincerely avow. On the other hand, undermining propaganda will do so by use of lan-
guage that implicitly relies upon and encourages conventions that undermine the expressed 
ideal (Stanley 2015, 168- 169). Because the undermining aspect of the propagandist’s 
speech is contained in the habits of mind and conventional associations that certain words 
trigger it can remain hidden even to the propagandist herself. In this fashion undermining 
demagoguery is able to mobilize and entrench in citizens conventions that are anti-demo-
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cratic, while keeping this fact out of the public sphere and away from democratic scrutiny. 
For example, pundits in the U.S. who call for measures to stop voter fraud in order to se-
cure fair elections may gain audience because of a flawed ideology in white citizens that as-
sociates fraud with blackness and brownness while associating fair elections and citizenry 
with whiteness. This flawed ideology has a long history in the United States, one that not 
only undermines fairness, but also ignores the history of voter suppression in the U.S. in 
the service of white supremacy. Without even mentioning race, calls to stop voter fraud can 
mobilize and solidify racist associations and active ignorances while shielding them from 
public debate, since the explicit content of the claim appeals simply to fairness. Another 
example that illustrates this mechanism is the “no special rights campaign,” which in 1991 
successfully added to the charter of Cincinnati, Ohio an amendment explicitly prohibiting 
the creation of laws that would ban discrimination against gays and lesbians. Here, the con-
tradiction in passing an amendment securing special rights for heterosexuals on the basis of 
an appeal to “no special rights” was masked by an ideology that perceives gays and lesbians 
as a “special interest” group in contrast to heterosexuals, who are perceived simply as “nor-
mal.”
However, these examples (and almost all of the examples in Stanley’s book) may op-
erate in a way that does not allow us to fully understand the force of undermining propa-
ganda insofar as the flawed ideologies that support them may be too easy for readers to re-
ject. The advantage of illustrating undermining propaganda with such examples is that 
one can clearly identify the contradictions within them and so analyze the mechanisms by 
which they work. The disadvantage of such examples is that they do not give readers any 
insight into how we ourselves might be taken in by (and even make) claims that undermine 
the ideals our claims express. In other words, I think Stanley’s insistence on what he calls 
the sincerity condition (i.e. that propaganda may be spoken sincerely) could do more work 
to make readers who agree with him more self-reflective. If we are to be more reflective in 
our judgments and less taken in by undermining propaganda, it is important to consider 
examples that help not just to highlight the way undermining propaganda undermines, 
but also to illuminate the force with which it is able to captivate. We might then better un-
derstand and more fully appreciate what is at work when we ourselves are swayed by un-
dermining propaganda. For this reason, I consider another example that depends upon a 
flawed ideology to which I am sometimes susceptible insofar as I would like to think of my-
self as a person who is just even while I occupy a social position that in many ways is un-
justly privileged in relation to others.
The work that Rachel McKinnon and others have been doing to point out the prob-
lems with “ally culture” (McKinnon forthcoming) reveals that the idea of being an “ally” to 
non-dominantly situated persons can operate as undermining propaganda. While it is im-
portant for those who do not suffer under a particular oppression to recognize and struggle 
with others to respond to the injustice of oppression, the term “ally” used to designate such 
persons often (if not always) has the effect of undermining this very task. Conversations of 
the following sort demonstrate the problem. Person A stands in a relation of dominance to 
person B but wants to work toward changing the systems of oppression that make this the 
case. However, because person A has lived in a position of dominance relative to person B’s 
social position for so long, person A will at times habitually say and do things that are harm-
ful to person B, despite person A’s avowed commitments. When this happens and person B 
points it out, person A might respond by saying, “But I’m on your side! You know I would 
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never do anything to hurt you!” Person B tries to bring the conversation back to the point 
by saying: “But can’t you see how what you just did/said is harmful?!” To which person A 
replies with one of the following, “I’m deeply offended and hurt by the fact that you think 
I’m not your ally!” or “We need to work together if we want to overcome injustice, so you 
really need to trust the fact that I’m your ally.” or “If you can’t even get along with people 
who support you, how are you ever going to change people who are truly against you?” In 
this example, person A is governed by a flawed ideology that insists, among other things, 
that recognizing the injustice of oppression entails that one is no longer part of the system 
that perpetuates it, a false inference held together by the term “ally.”
This example reveals two additional aspects of flawed ideologies that give further in-
sight into the way in which they can operate perniciously in the service of social power. 
First, I have no doubt that person A is feeling something painful at the moment person B 
points out the harm A has done, as I have sometimes felt when the harmful effects of my 
words and actions have been pointed out to me by people whom I claim and would like to 
support. It is worth noting however that in the face of this difficulty the dominantly situ-
ated person can fall back on habits that situate non-dominantly situated persons as respon-
sible for all the affective labor in our interactions with one another. Second, it is worth 
noting that insisting on a dominantly situated person’s allyship in the face of a non-dom-
inantly situated person’s claim that she was harmed is a way of keeping epistemic atten-
tion focused on the world as experienced from dominant social positions and away from 
the world as experienced from non-dominant social positions. These two additional points 
bring into focus the degree to which dominantly held flawed ideologies can govern our af-
fective and epistemic interactions with one another in ways that maintain relations of dom-
inance and oppression.
In contrast to the language of “allies” and “allyship” McKinnon’s recommendation that 
we use the language of “active” and “passive” bystanders helps to keep in mind that those 
who are privileged in relations of dominance and oppression can still perpetuate harm even 
when consciously not wanting to do so (McKinnon forthcoming). McKinnon’s language 
also helps to keep in mind that the work of struggling against injustices is ongoing and that 
the privileged person always has the option of walking away from this struggle. Indeed that 
is one of a dominantly situated person’s privileges: not having to face systematic injustice. 
Changing the language we use to describe who we are and what we are doing is one (al-
though not the only) way we can redirect epistemic attention in order to struggle against 
flawed ideologies in ourselves and others. Still, flawed ideologies have a way of keeping peo-
ple on what Patricia Williams describes as “a linguistic treadmill;” as she explains, “no word 
I use to positively describe myself or my scholarly projects lasts more than five seconds. I 
can no longer justify my presence in academia, for example, with words in the English lan-
guage. The moment I find some symbol of my presence in the rarefied halls of elite institu-
tions, it gets stolen, co-opted, filled with negative meaning” (1995, 27). Williams’ words 
remind us that there is no permanent “fix” that will ensure that our words will do what we 
want them to do. In other words, flawed ideologies can infiltrate and work with our lan-
guage in unforeseen ways so that to resist pernicious propaganda, particularly under con-
ditions of dominance and oppression, requires continual vigilance concerning the ways in 
which words move and fail to move language users to action.
Considering how to combat the sort of propaganda that undermines democracy, 
Stanley contends that there is another kind of propaganda (a “good” kind) that may be nec-
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essary to dislodge (and even to undermine) obstacles to the realization of democratic ideals. 
This he terms “civic rhetoric,” the purpose of which is to appeal to emotion in order to in-
crease reasonableness (2015, 111), or taking the concerns of all into account. Understand-
ing why propaganda, in the form of civic rhetoric, may be necessary in such cases requires 
again understanding how propaganda works in tandem with ideology. Recall that an ideol-
ogy is “the record of expectations of various goods built out of regularities of convention… 
the beliefs that unreflectively guide us through the social world” (2015, 184). In other 
words, for Stanley an ideology describes the ways in which epistemic attention is gener-
ally directed and coordinated with others. These coordinated regularities and associations, 
or shared habits of mind, comprise our ability to make sense of the world to ourselves and 
others. Coordination here comes about through practice and habituation; it is also facili-
tated through structural features of one’s environment, including social structures. Demo-
cratic deliberation is also supposed to be a kind of coordinating, although here it involves 
(ideally) the giving and considering of reasons in favor of accepting or rejecting particular 
claims which will then be used to govern our action together. In the latter, claims may be 
found to be true or false, and they are subject to reasons—this is how we are supposed to 
come to non-coercive agreement. In the former, things are a little trickier, which is why 
Stanley argues that civic rhetoric and material equality are necessary to disrupt and prevent 
what he calls flawed, but not false, ideologies.
A flawed ideology contains regular expectations and shared conventions that, if ar-
ticulated in the form of a belief, contradict the ideal(s) forwarded by the propaganda with 
which these expectations and conventions are set in motion. To return to a previous exam-
ple, if the word “fairness” is regularly associated with people who are white1 and the word 
“fraud” is regularly associated with people who are not white, the problem with propagan-
distic appeals to ensure fair elections by combatting voter fraud is not with the expressed 
ideal of “being just” but with an ideology (or set of shared conventions) that regularly asso-
ciates light skinned people with (and habitually expects dark skinned people to be enemies 
of) this ideal. To combat the undermining aspect of the propaganda is not to disagree with 
the avowed belief it directly expresses, but to work to change the implicit associations and 
expectations that the words used to express the belief trigger. In other words, the problem-
atic feature is contained not in what the propaganda says, but in what it does, which is em-
bodied in how people respond to it.
In the case of undermining demagoguery, appeals to our accountability to one an-
other, or “reasonableness,” implicitly engage flawed ideologies that ignore and exclude the 
voices of particular people, thereby decreasing accountability and reasonableness. This kind 
of propaganda cannot be remedied by more appeals to accountability and reasonableness 
since the appeals themselves work in tandem with flawed ideologies, ways of acting in the 
world, that run counter to the ideals expressed by accountability and reasonableness. Ironi-
cally, in such cases appeals to reasonableness and accountability will lead to less reasonable-
ness and less accountability. What is needed then is not a new ideal, but rather a new way 
of acting. Remedies to undermining demagoguery must therefore help those taken in by it 
to act differently. If the problem of undermining demagoguery is located in the expecta-
tions and habits of mind shared by a community, remedies must work to change those ex-
1 It is worth noting here that the same word “fair” can mean both “just” and “light skinned.”
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pectations and habits. Stanley’s examples of civic rhetoric do precisely that. These examples 
include the writing of Black American intellectual Fannie Barrier Williams, the visual im-
ages of police brutality against civil rights marchers in Selma Alabama, and John Coltrane’s 
version of “My Favorite Things” as analyzed by Ingrid Monson. In all three cases, readers, 
viewers, and listeners are being called upon and encouraged to pay attention to aspects of 
the world that their ideology disposes them to systematically ignore. Importantly, in each 
case they are not being asked to espouse a different or new set of beliefs but rather to attend 
to the world differently.
Here we can begin to see how Stanley’s own rhetoric, which emphasizes belief, may 
be unhelpful for remedying (and may even undermine Stanley’s expressed desire to rem-
edy) the problems of flawed ideologies. While our ways of attending to the world can be 
articulated in terms of a set of claims or beliefs, thinking about what is happening with 
what Stanley calls “flawed ideologies” as an actual set of claims or beliefs makes it seem as 
though the ideology which guides one’s attention to the world is something of which one 
is consciously aware or even of which one could become aware on one’s own. While beliefs 
and belief structures are things we cannot simply change at will, in common parlance peo-
ple often speak of beliefs as things they avow and hold. For example, it is quite common for 
a white person to say “I don’t hold racist beliefs” (and sincerely believe that to be the case) 
even though her perception of the world is structured by racial implicit bias.2 As with the 
example concerning allies and ally culture, I am concerned here about the way in which 
public discourse regarding the harms to historically oppressed groups is often reduced to 
talk about what people believe (or want to believe) as opposed to the actual harm people, in 
conjunction with historical institutions and practices, do. My contention here is not that 
the language of belief cannot sensibly be used to describe flawed ideologies; in fact I think 
it can. Rather I am arguing that nonetheless we ought not use the language of belief to de-
scribe flawed ideologies because of the way in which the language of belief itself might en-
gage a flawed ideology. Specifically, I am concerned with the way dominantly positioned 
persons may have a habit of expecting that they are the final arbiter concerning the signifi-
cance of their actions and that they need not consult others outside of themselves (or at the 
very least not those in relation to whom they have social power) in order to discern whether 
they are acting in ways that are responsible to others. The language of belief calls attention 
to the subjective state of the individual who holds the belief, so using this language to de-
scribe the set of expectations and habits of attention embodied in a flawed ideology can be 
easily coopted into an expectation that one’s avowed subjective state (what the subject in-
tends and takes herself to mean) is all that matters in our interactions with others. Thus, 
the language of belief fits too neatly with a flawed ideology that makes dominantly situated 
persons less accountable to others by systematically returning their attention to their own 
subjective states instead of to the effects of their actions on others.
In contrast, I recommend shifting to a different rhetoric to describe flawed ideologies, 
one that emphasizes action and movement.3 The language of action and movement (as op-
2 One might object that this just means people ought to stop talking about beliefs in this way. However, 
what I say about belief in the next paragraph warrants dropping the language of belief.
3 Phyllis Rooney’s attention to how a shift from “knowledge” to “knowing” as a starting term can 
broaden the scope of concern in epistemology (Rooney 2012, 358-360) has been very helpful for me in 
thinking about the idea of epistemic movement.
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posed to the language of belief) calls closer attention to what flawed ideologies do. What 
needs to change in order to dislodge demagoguery is not to avow new beliefs or to express 
affirmation of new claims, but to change coordinated epistemic action. In this light, civic 
rhetoric is more aptly understood as the art of disrupting and attempting to change the way 
we attend to the world, so as to widen our scope of attention. The framework of “ideologi-
cal beliefs” calls epistemic attention to the world as experienced by the person governed by 
the ideology, whereas the terms “epistemic action” and “epistemic movement” call atten-
tion to what those ideologies do to the people with whom the one governed by a particu-
lar ideology interacts. Moreover, whereas the language of belief can be separated from epis-
temic actors, the language of epistemic action and epistemic movement reminds us that (1.) 
knowers are affectively moved to reason about and know some things as opposed to others 
and (2.) knowing (along with other epistemic practices) is always embodied and situated in 
the world.
These points are connected to something that is not prominent in Stanley’s account 
(although it is mentioned toward the end of the book and funds Stanley’s account of civic 
rhetoric). That is the importance of social movements in changing the world and the way 
we regard it. The argument for material equality in How Propaganda Works frames the so-
lution to undermining demagoguery as being possibly one of two things: either to have in-
dividuals change their mental states or to institute structural change so as to remove fea-
tures of our social world that lead to flawed ideologies. Having framed things in this way, 
Stanley argues for the latter. However, framing solutions in this manner fails to show us 
how institutional structural change is possible—after all change must be implemented by 
people.
One of the reasons why Stanley thinks we need to focus on material equality as op-
posed to changing individual mental states is the way ideologies are held stubbornly in place 
given their relation to our conception of ourselves and our communities. As Stanley puts it 
quite nicely, “individuals… don’t like to leave their friends behind” (2015, 186).4 However, 
I may not always need to leave my friends behind if we are similarly oppressively situated in 
the world in ways that allow for resistant epistemic communities. This is clearly seen in the 
case of racism and white supremacy in the U.S. It is not the case that racism has been un-
noticed by, unintelligible to, or uniformly accepted by Black people in the U.S.. Instead it is 
more apt to say that racism and its effects have been systematically and relentlessly ignored 
by white people in the U.S., despite the efforts of Black Americans to call attention to and 
combat it.
Stanley’s skepticism about changing individual belief states appears to align, however, 
once again too closely with the flawed ideologies that support and maintain dominant in-
terests. I am skeptical, too, that dominantly positioned people will (or are even able to) 
change their ways of perceiving and approaching the world, particularly if they steadfastly 
refuse to be epistemically moved by actual non-dominantly situated persons with whom 
they regularly interact. However, insisting on the resilience of flawed ideologies for those 
who are harmed by them fails to acknowledge that there are things pressing on non-domi-
4 We might add to this, changing one’s way of moving through the world epistemically speaking can 
make a person less intelligible (and sometimes quite unintelligible) to the people with whom one has 
come to know the world together.
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nantly situated people that can move non-dominantly situated people to perceive the world 
differently. This can be seen, for example, in LGBT politics and activism. If one is non-
dominantly situated with respect to sexuality and/or gender identity, one will be raised in 
a society that encourages one to repudiate one’s own desires and understandings of oneself. 
Moreover, one will be encouraged to attend epistemically to the world in ways that make 
one’s desires and experiences unintelligible to oneself. But this repudiation and unintelligi-
bility is for many people unsustainable. This is why many LGBT persons are forced to leave 
their families and communities; it is also why LGBT people can become literally unintelli-
gible to the families and communities they leave. In such cases, unintelligibility is owing to 
being governed by different ideologies, that is different expectations and regularities of con-
vention. Finally, in some cases those who are dominantly situated in relation to, but none-
theless love their family members and friends who are LGBT more than their ideologies 
can bear, are sometimes moved to abandon those ideologies. From this perspective, think-
ing about the epistemic importance of creating and sustaining new communities where we 
can learn to attend to the world differently is pressing. In addition, dominantly situated 
people, if they are to change, need to pay attention to and learn to use the epistemic re-
sources and resistances already available to those historically oppressed who have developed 
less flawed ways of epistemically moving through the world.
Reasonableness, empathy, and considering the views of others
These points may appear to be compatible with Stanley’s characterization of reasonableness 
as requiring “empathy or the capacity to put oneself in another’s shoes” (108). It is important, 
however, to distinguish what I am recommending from the notion of empathy and the 
project of “putting oneself in another’s shoes.” While it is clear that democracy requires one 
to “take one’s proposals to be accountable to everyone in the community” (Stanley 2015, 
108), this need not require feeling what others feel, or being able to perceive what others 
perceive without concrete engagement with them. Consequently, we can excise the impor-
tance of taking one’s proposals to be accountable to all from talk of empathy and inhabiting 
others’ perspectives. Furthermore, there are a number of good reasons for doing so.
Black feminists and feminist of color have, for example, long called attention to the 
damage incurred by analogizing experiences of oppression to one’s own experiences as a 
way of attempting to inhabit another’s perspective and/or be empathetic. Such exercises 
have a way of epistemically exploiting those in relation to whom one is privileged, while si-
multaneously making invisible important aspects of the experiences one is claiming to un-
derstand.5 In addition, the desire to inhabit another’s perspective may in fact actually lead 
one to attempt to change or actively suppress that perspective because the information con-
tained therein is very painful.6 Finally attempts to empathize may imply a kind of symme-
try where there is no symmetry at all. Part of recognizing another person’s oppression rela-
tive to one’s privilege is acknowledging that asymmetry.7
5 See for example Grillo and Wildman 1991.
6 See for example Ahmed 2010.
7 See for example Iris Marion Young 1997.
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One might object that these concerns demonstrate why true empathy is the ideal we 
ought to strive toward, and that the worries raised here are things that happen when an 
appeal to empathy is working through a piece of pernicious demagoguery. While I would 
agree that the examples I have called attention to are indeed failures, my caution against 
positing empathy as a process that will make knowers accountable to one another is that 
making empathy the goal may supplant the actual goal of being accountable to one an-
other. In other words, calls to empathize may, in a vein similar to the language of be-
lief, work in tandem with a flawed ideology that calls attention to the subjective states 
of dominantly situated individuals instead of to the voices of those who are non-domi-
nantly situated. We can begin to see that this is the case if we ask what empathy does or 
adds to the imperative to consider other people’s perspectives. Why not just seek to con-
sider others’ perspectives and then ask them if we’ve gotten things wrong? Why add em-
pathy into the mix?
It strikes me that empathy is often added to the equation so as to locate a standard for 
success at considering other people’s perspectives in a way that allows the one being evalu-
ated to dispense with the actual person whose perspective one is purportedly considering. 
Because empathy is associated with a feeling that is located within individuals, it is easier 
to claim by individuals than the accountability to others it is said to guarantee. For this 
reason, the turn to empathy can function similarly to the way “good intention” functions 
in white discourse as a way to deflect charges of racism and racist harm. That is, white 
people in a white supremacist society often assure themselves of their goodness and non-
complicity in racist institutions by way of something they appear to control individually: 
their intentions, even if their actions and the institutions by which they are privileged can 
have harmful effects regardless of intention. Likewise, empathy draws our attention to the 
empathizer’s feelings and/or thoughts, something that we must consult the empathizer to 
access. However, if we are to discern whether we have successfully and adequately consid-
ered another’s concerns, interests, and/or perspectives, our attention should be drawn not 
to ourselves but rather to those others. The most straightforward way to assess whether 
I have seriously and adequately considered or understood another’s perspective is to ask 
them.8 In light of these concerns, reasonableness, as the capacity to take into account 
other people’s perspectives, ought to be understood as an interactive (and not an individu-
ally empathic) ability.
Attending to injustice and disempowered populations
My concern with the language of belief to describe flawed ideology and with the ideal of 
empathy to describe accountability to others stems from a concern with a flawed ideology 
characteristic of relations of dominance and oppression: the tendency (or habituated con-
vention) of directing epistemic attention toward the subjective experiences of those domi-
8 This, of course, is complicated by the fact that structural conditions sometimes make it nearly impos-
sible for non- dominantly situated persons to answer truthfully, since disturbing those in relation to 
whom they are oppressed may be dangerous or because dominantly situated persons are epistemically 
incompetent with regard to genuinely engaging in non-coercive epistemic interaction with non-domi-
nantly situated knowers. See for example Henning 2015 and Pohlhaus, Jr. 2012.
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nantly situated and away from the world as experienced by non-dominantly situated sub-
jects. For this same reason, I am deeply concerned by Stanley’s argument that structural 
inequality will lead those who are disadvantaged to accept flawed ideologies that regularly 
expect that they themselves are inferior to those with material power. Again, I am worried 
about what these arguments do. Specifically, I am worried that such arguments encourage 
us to think of non-dominantly situated persons as causally related to one another in a man-
ner that does not engage them as full epistemic agents. By this I do not mean to say that we 
should not recognize that all people swim in the waters that encourage all of us to approach 
reality with perceptual biases that advantage dominantly situated persons (I think we do). 
What I am worried about is making arguments that suggest that the social positioning of 
non-dominantly situated persons specifically causes them in particular, in virtue of their 
non-dominant positioning, to approach the world in a way that accepts their supposed in-
feriority. First let me point out though some direct problems with the arguments Stanley 
uses to support his claim that the oppressed will be particularly susceptible to flawed ideol-
ogies used to justify their own oppression.
One problem is that there are so many different examples Stanley draws upon to 
make his argument without really distinguishing among them and without recognizing 
that relations of dominance and oppression are multiple and complexly figured in relation 
to one another. Instead, he writes of only two social positions: “the advantaged elite” and 
the “negatively privileged” as if one could not be both at the same time. There are sig-
nificant differences in how various axes of oppression work and people are complexly 
situated within them. Failure to acknowledge these complexities has been a serious prob-
lem for theories of oppression that focus on only one axis of oppression such as Marxism 
and hegemonic white feminism. Likewise I think it is a serious flaw in How Propaganda 
Works.
To take one example, Stanley uses the belief held by a majority of U.S. citizens that the 
war in Iraq was justified as evidence that those who are disadvantaged will be swayed by 
ideologies that justify their being disadvantaged (2015, 241-246). However, the flawed ide-
ologies that mobilized support for the war drew on Islamaphobia and colonialist ideologies 
that figure U.S. citizens as superior to those in Iraq even while they do so in order to gain 
support for what is against most U.S. citizens’ interests. In other words, U.S. citizens’ ac-
ceptance of the war in Iraq need not be equated with an acceptance by those who suffer due 
to serious inequities in the U.S. that they are less deserving than the wealthy. There is a dif-
ference between believing something that is falsely presented as in your interest and believ-
ing that your own interests, perspective, and day to day living are not worthy of considera-
tion.
In addition, I worry about the way Stanley uses social psychology to support his ar-
guments as though the mechanisms by which they work are self-evident and where those 
mechanisms are framed in causal (as opposed to agential) terms. For example, he calls at-
tention to the empirical studies on stereotype threat to argue that the “undeniably real psy-
chological phenomenon of stereotype threat is the naturalistic basis for the adoption of the 
flawed ideology of the elite group by the negatively privileged group” (Stanley 2015, 240). 
But is this really what is happening in the mechanisms described in such cases? Why de-
scribe the added epistemic disadvantage of needing to be aware of how others’ perceive you 
and knowing that those others will negatively perceive you as actually accepting that nega-
tive perception? And why describe the rational withdraw from a game so clearly rigged as 
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accepting the negative perception that pushed you out of the game? Why not see the re-
fusal to play as a refusal to accept the unfair terms of the game itself?
The “puzzle” of why the oppressed don’t “throw off their chains” may only be a puzzle 
if (1.) we do not recognize that ideologies are multiple and complexly related due to mul-
tiple axes of oppression and (2.) we fail to perceive resistance to oppression. I don’t think, 
however, that Stanley’s argument for material equality hangs on the idea that the oppressed 
will buy into their own inferiority. It is enough to warrant epistemic alarm that those as-
pects by which one is privileged in relations of dominance and oppression can lead one to 
systematically disregard those in relation to whom one is privileged and that we are all com-
plexly figured in relations of dominance and oppression.
If we follow the line of reasoning that says material inequality is bad for democracy, 
in part, because it leads those who suffer from inequalities to believe in their own inferior-
ity, we might fail to attend to the ways in which those who suffer from inequalities have re-
sisted their unjust treatment as well as the ways in which those who benefit from inequali-
ties have shut down this resistance while thinking (or at least claiming) that this shutting 
down of resistance is necessary and just. To ignore the resistance of those who suffer from 
inequities is characteristic of dominant flawed ideologies. Consequently, it is imperative 
not to do so.
Calling attention to how propaganda works sheds light on how our own language and 
arguments can participate in the undermining of the ideals we espouse. For this reason it 
is important to attend not only to what we say, but to how we say it and to what our way 
of saying things does. Stanley’s analysis of how flawed ideologies can work in tandem with 
what we say in a manner that is self-undermining provides an important lesson. Ultimately, 
it is one that leads me to disagree with some of the ways in which Stanley has framed his ar-
guments, not so much because of what they say but because of what they do. Specifically, 
by emphasizing the language of belief, forwarding the ideal of empathy, and (in places) 
framing non-dominantly situated subjects as causally determined objects, Stanley’s rheto-
ric aligns too closely with the interests of privileged subjects in relations of dominance and 
oppression. Instead the rhetoric we use to analyze pernicious propaganda must not only ac-
curately reflect how propaganda works but also disengage from and resist the flawed ideolo-
gies that allow it to work.
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